BJ 49 

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LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 




BJ 49 

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Copy 1 



REMARKS, 



BAXTER, PRINTER, OXFORD. 



R E M A R K S 



ARISTOTELIAN AND PLATONIC 
ETHICS, 



BRANCH OF THE STUDIES 



PURSUED IN 



THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD. 



BY THE^/ 

REV. FREDERICK OAKELEY, M.A. 

FELLOW OF BALLIOL COLLEGE 



OXFORD, 

PRINTED FOR J. H. PARKER ; 
AND J. G. AND F. RIYINGTON, LONDON. 

1837. 



Such thoughts, the wreck of Paradise, 

Tli rough many a dreary age, 
Upbore whate'er of good and wise 

Yet lived in Bard or Sage : 

They marked what agonizing throes 

Shook the great mother's womb ; 
But Reason's spells might not disclose 

The gracious birth to come ; 

****** 
The hour that saw from opening Heaven 

Redeeming glory stream, 
Beyond the summer hues of even, 

Beyond the mid-day beam. 

Thenceforth, to eyes of high desire, 

The meanest things below, 
As with a Seraph's robe of fire 

Invested, burn and glow. 

Chbistian Year. Fourth Sunday after Trinity. 



TO 

THE AUTHOR OF THE ABOVE STANZAS 
THE FOLLOWING PAGES 

OF 

WHICH THE DESIGN 
HOW IMPERFECTLY SOEVER EXECUTED 
IS 

TO RECOMMEND THE STUDY OF HEATHEN ETHICS 
IN THE 

SPIRIT OF THE CHURCH 
ARE RESPECTFULLY INSCRIBED 
UNDER 

A GRATEFUL SENSE OF THE BENEFIT 
WHICH HE HAS BEEN ENABLED TO CONFER 
UPON THE PRESENT AGE. 



/ 



ADVERTISEMENT. 



The Author thinks it necessary to state, 
that the following Remarks were written 
by him, with a view to publication, some 
time before the delivery, from the Univer- 
sity Pulpit, of a Sermon, on the Connexion 
of Heathen Ethics with Divine Revelation 
and the Church System, by Mr. Woodgate, 
Fellow of St. John's College; and quite 
independently of any communication with 
that Gentleman. 

The interest which Mr. Woodgate's Dis- 
course has excited in the University is, to 
the Author's mind, a proof of the demand 
for some work of the kind suggested in 
the following pages ; a demand which Mr. 
Woodgate has proved himself well able to 
satisfy. 



8 



The Author must remind those persons 
in the University, to whom many of the 
following remarks will sound like a " thrice 
told tale/' that one of his objects in putting 
them forth is to convey, as far as he is able, 
to persons unacquainted, or deficiently ac- 
quainted, with Oxford, some information 
relative to our Ethical Studies. 

Balliol College, March 3, 1837. 



REMARKS, 



Of Heathen Ethics, in connexion with Divine Opposite 
Revelation, two opposite views are entertained ; Heathen 

"i 1 1 • j • • i Ethics. 

both, it is conceived, erroneous. 

By some, Revelation, as a practical system, is 
regarded as little more than a republication of 
Heathen morality. 

By others, it is held to be altogether distinct 
from every other Moral System ; insomuch, that 
to institute any comparison between it and the 
speculations of Heathen philosophers, except in 
the way of contrast, is deemed an injury to Divine 
Truth, and almost a profanation of it. 

If the former of these views be right, whence, 
we may ask, arises the marvellous difference 
between the Gospel, and every moral system 
independent of it, in respect of practical results ? 
For, all the systems together being professedly 
practical ; all avowing as their aim the formation 
of a character in man answerable to the end of 
his existence; the excellence of each ougbt, in 



10 



reason, to be measured by its tendency to effect 
this object. 

Now I am not aware that, even by those who 
think thus disparagingly of Revelation, or thus 
highly of the efforts of unaided Reason, it is 
commonly denied, that the Christian Character, 
not in its abstract beauty alone, but as it has 
again and again been realized in practice, is in- 
comparably superior to that which the philo- 
sophers of antiquity, or any of their followers, 
are known to have exhibited ; or, at all events, 
to that which, in any number of instances, re- 
sulted from their systems. If, however, this 
statement be denied by the impugners of Divine 
Revelation, we may appeal, without any doubt of 
the result, from their decision in the matter, to 
that of more impartial judges. 

On the other hand, if it be true, that the 
morality of Revelation presents nothing but a 
series of contradictions to that of Heathen Sys- 
tems, it would seem more than questionable, 
whether it be right to imbue, as in this Univer- 
sity, the minds of Christian students with a large 
portion of Heathen Ethics, without, at least, 
taking care (as no one obviously does) to im- 
press them with notions of the falsity of the 
systems, to the study of which they are expected 
to give up so much of their time. 



11 



The truth seems to lie between these extreme Interme- 

. . -r» i • i i i ^iate viev 

opinions. Revelation has authoritatively pub- the true 
lished what Heathen philosophers taught. And 
yet, as a system capable of realizing its designs, 
it stands entirely alone. It has tilled up those 
gaps in the ancient systems, by reason of which, 
notwithstanding all their beauty, and even con- 
sistency, as theories, they were fundamentally, 
and, as things then were, irremediably, defective. 
We read, therefore, Heathen Ethics at Oxford, 
for the purpose, among others, of learning what 
mere Reason could do towards teaching man his 
Duty ; and we read, or ought to read, them in 
connexion with Divine Revelation, that we may 
know wherein, precisely, our Rule of life tran- 
scends the theories of the wisest Heathens. 

Yet is there no need to set the two systems in 
invidious contrast. Heathen philosophy is not 
wrong, but imperfect ; and Revelation has not 
reversed, but corrected and completed, it. It is 
not more the characteristic excellence of Reve- 
lation in the comparison with Heathen Ethics, 
than its coincidence with them in certain remark- 
able instances, which speaks of its Divine origin. 
For, if the Gospel be not Inspired, what is it ? 
A collection of the writings of simple-minded, 
and, for the most part, illiterate, men. Whence, 
then, this Practical Scheme, so perfect in its con- 



12 



sistency ; so powerful in its efficacy ; which, 
agreeing, in outline, with the best Heathen sys- 
tems, has completed them just where they were 
obviously defective; and gone to form characters 
(a matter, be it observed, of experience) which, 
by the consent of all who are capable of deciding 
in such a case, have made the nearest approaches 
to Perfection? The analogy of the Divine pro- 
ceedings w 7 ould lead us to expect that Reason, 
the gift of God, sincerely exercised in investigat- 
ing Moral Truth, would terminate in something- 
better than unmixed error. But, if there be any, 
who are little satisfied with a priori reasoning 
upon such a subject, there is still, for their con- 
viction, a vast reserve of proof, arising out of 
the facts of the case. 
Design of To point out, in a few instances, the Agree- 

the present , 

Remarks, ment at once, and the Difference, between the 
Practical Scheme of Divine Revelation and the 
theories of some of those Heathen philosophers, 
with whose writings we are, in this University, 
familiar, is one object of the following remarks. 
Another, implied in the former, is, to vindi- 
cate against reproach, and to protect, as far 
as may be, from misrepresentation, the Theory 
and Practice of our Academical System; which, 
making, as it obviously does, a knowledge of 
Revealed Religion the first end of Education, and 



that to which all else is to be not subordinate 
merely, but subservient ; yet recognizes as most 
valuable, the study of various other subjects, 
and chiefly of the Aristotelian Philosophy, in 
reference to this primary and paramount end. 
And, forasmuch as the basis of our System is 
not Revelation merely, but that particular View 
of it, which our Reformers adopted from Ca- 
tholic Antiquity, at the same time freeing the 
doctrine of the Church from the superincumbent 
weight of Popish additions, it would plainly be a 
benefit to shew, as shall be attempted, that the 
character of our Ethical, as of our other, studies 
in this place, falls in with the peculiar System and 
Designs of our Church. The more immediate 
object, however, of these pages, is to throw out, 
for the use of Students in the University, a few 
hints upon the study of the works of Heathen 
philosophers as a branch of Christian Education. 
Practically, I am inclined to think, Divinity and 
Heathen Ethics are studied by candidates for the 
First Degree too much as distinct subjects ; the 
former often superficially, and with a view to the 
collection of a certain number of details, rather 
than in its scope and application as a Practical 
System ; the latter, as an evidence of the opi- 
nions of certain individuals, rather than as a con- 
sistent Scheme, perpetually admitting of most 




14 



valuable illustration, from a Book of Inspired, 
and, therefore, Infallible, Disclosures upon the 
same subject. It is, doubtless, most desirable 
to make all our studies bear, as much as pos- 
sible, upon Religion ; but none so little admits 
of being kept apart from it, as Moral Philo- 
sophy. The bearing of History, for instance, 
or of Poetry, upon Religion, though, of course, 
real, is yet indirect. It may be better left, 
in these instances, to suggest itself at a future 
time. But the habit of viewing subjects of Moral 
Inquiry apart from Religion, must be more than 
negatively hurtful to the mind ; except only upon 
the hypothesis, which regards them as entirely 
distinct questions. It is dangerous to acquire the 
habit of viewing subjects essentially Practical in 
the light of mere theories a . Such a habit tends 
to exhaust energies, and misuse impressions 

a My Oxford readers will not need to be reminded 
of the following passage. ' ' Going over the theory of 
virtue in one's thoughts, talking well, and drawing 
fine pictures, of it ; this is so far from necessarily or 
certainly conducing to form an habit of it in him 
who thus employs himself, that it may harden the 
mind in a contrary course, and render it gradually 
more insensible, i. e. form an habit of insensibility, to 
all moral considerations. For, from our very faculty 
of habits, passive impressions, by being repeated, grow 
weaker." Bp. Butler's Analogy, part i. c. 5. 



15 



given for a better purpose. It is like wasting 
sympathies upon unreal sorrows b . The subject 
of Ethics (Heathen or other, if every where 
the same) should be treated as serious, and 
even sacred. If not more or less practical, it 
is of no real use c . If practical in any degree, 
it sustains a species of profanation in being made 
a mere test of intellectual skill, and a mere 
way to Academical distinction. And what is 
true of all Ethics, is true, in an infinitely higher 
degree, of the Divine Ethics of the Gospel. 
While I would urge upon our students a more 
thoughtful mode of studying both Divinity and 
Heathen philosophy, I would most anxiously 
guard against seeming to represent the study of 
Divine Truth in the light of an intellectual exer- 
cise, or to recommend a philosophizing mode of 
viewing it. Nothing can be conceived more at 
variance with the spirit of this place than such 
a habit. We seek not here to philosophize 
Religion, but to sanctify Philosophy. We would 
illustrate the works of Heathen philosophers 
from Holy Scripture ; not Holy Scripture from 

h See Mr. Newman's Sermon on St. Luke's Day. 
(Sermons, Vol. II.) 

uya&oi ysvco/xeta* ens) ouSev av ijv o<psho$ ccvtyi$. Arist. 
Eth. lib. ii. c. 2. 



16 



them; except, only, in the way of evidence. But 
the experience of many will bear out the asser- 
tion, that, as things now are, the study of 
Divinity, obviously designed by the very condi- 
tion of Matriculation to be distributed over 
the whole of the Undergraduate residence, is 
often practically delayed to the latest possible 
period 0 ; and then limited to the acquisition of the 

c I s*peak here of the frequent practice of Students 
themselves, not of the administration of the Academical 
System in the different Colleges. In that with which 
I happen to be best acquainted, provision is made for 
the study of (elementary) Divinity throughout the 
whole of the Undergraduate residence. Every Under- 
graduate of Balliol College is required to read, with 
his Tutor, three at least of the Four Gospels and 
the Acts of the Apostles in the original language, 
with Dr. Paley's Horse Paulinse ; the Articles of the 
Church of England with a Commentary ; one of 
the standard Treatises on the Common Prayer, or 
some other work of authorized Divinity; besides 
analyzing the whole of the Old Testament History. 
By a special institution in the same College, he is 
likewise required to hear, and analyze, a written 
Course of Lectures on the Lord's Prayer, Creed, 
Commandments, Sacraments, and in fact every sub- 
ject of elementary and practical Divinity, with which 
ordinary Christians need to be acquainted. I have 
good reason for believing, that similar opportunities 
are held out in other Colleges to students desirous of 
profiting by them. 



17 



supposed minimum of attainment ; while, on the 
other hand, no pains are spared to gain a com- 
petent knowledge of the writings of Heathen 
philosophers. The result of this practice is, that 
when the (comparatively) worthless object of the 
Academical Honour has been gained, the student, 
unless led by professional occupations in the 
University to pursue the subject, speedily forgets 
what, if studied as a matter of practical, and 
therefore permanent, interest, might have been a 
blessing to him through life. 

Granting, then, what none can reasonably 
doubt, that the design of Oxford in requiring 
from her students a competent knowledge of 
Divinity, is to make them not so much Theolo- 
gians, as well-instructed Christians, it may well 
be questioned, whether such design be not, 
through a thankless neglect of present privileges 
on the part of her students, too often frustrated. 
Of those who give up so much of their time 
to the study of Heathen Philosophy, it is surely 
to be expected, that they shall bestow at least 
an equal regard upon that Revealed Truth, by 
the light of which alone they can judge either 
of the excellence, or the defects, of Heathen 
wisdom ; and by the aid of which alone they 
learn, how Ethics may be made to pass from the 
character of an ingenious theory, into that of a 
Rule of life. 

£ 



18 



Superiority What means does the Gospel offer me for 

of the Evan- x 

theorist resisting such and such temptations ? It bids 
teiianRuie.me " watch and pray." What says Aristotle? 
He requires of his disciples to energize virtu- 
ously under the guidance of a Principle, which a 
course of Virtue alone can form within them ; 
but he leaves them without any sufficient means 
of overcoming, in the mean time, their natural 
weakness, and the force of temptation. They 
must, then, energize to gain habits, while, with- 
out habituation, they cannot energize perfectly. 
Here then is a difficulty, which, although it is not 
more in the Aristotelian System than in the 
nature of things, is one whereof nothing but 
Divine Revelation can furnish an adequate solu- 
tion. It is solved by the Doctrine, which bids 
us look out of ourselves at once for Direction and 
for Help. It is, in fact, a very correct account 
of the matter; and, with such supplement of 
Truth as the Christian is enabled to make to it, 
becomes a very sufficient Rule of duty. But we 
can conceive that, in itself, it would form but a 
feeble counterpoise to the force of temptation. 
Here, then, is a manifest superiority in the 
Christian System ; its recognition of the necessity 
of recourse to supernatural Aid both for Direction 
and for Strength. 

Again, we may conceive the possibility, in the 
Heathen disciple's mind, of another difficulty. 



19 



In my own lack of experience, (he may be 
supposed to say to his teacher,) you bid me 
have recourse to the experience of others' 1 . The 
practical result of your whole argument is to 
prove the necessity of Education. Those who 
now educate, were themselves by others edu- 
cated. Has this course of things gone on from 
all eternity ? If not, by whom was the first man 
educated ? This opens to us another difficulty 
in Heathen Systems ; the want of an infallible 
Authority. 

Now it is maintained, that this difficulty, like 
the last, arises from a deficiency, not an error, 
in Heathen philosophy. Might not the Chris- 
tian teacher, as in the last case he would say, 
" Act, that you may know," (although, in another 
sense, you must know, in order to act,) so in 
this ; " Take upon trust what cannot be proved 
to you by demonstration." Wherein, then, con- 
sists the difference between the two systems ? 
Simply, that, under Revelation, there is beyond 

d Toov Y.cS exourToc scrriv Yj <pgovY)Ctg, a ylvercu yvaogipu ££ 
i/XTreip/af' vsog 8* 'sfj^wsigog oux earf TtXrfiog yag %gdvov %0ir](Tsi 
tyjv hfjurstglotv. Arist. Eth. 1. vi. c. 8. 

e AsT 7rgo(rs^siv toov efj,7rslpoov xa) TrgecrfivTegoov % Qgovlpwv 
Toug otvonrofteixTOig Q>ot<rs<ri xot) $d%oug 9 oux v\ttov toov <x7rofai%eoov 
Sja yag to ep£S»v Ik t% ep7reig'nxg OfXfxa, ogoocri Tag ag%<xg. 
Id. 1. vi. c. 11. 

b 2 



20 



all, an Infallible Rule ; and before all, a Divine 
Monitor : this, anticipating and cooperating with 
every act of the responsible agent : that, remov- 
ing all doubt as to the ground of obligation to 
right conduct. 

Divinity This instance will, it is hoped, sufficiently 

how to be . J 

studied, prove what is meant by recommending the study 
of Divinity in connexion with that of Heathen 
Ethics. It is something as far as possible re- 
moved from the study of Religion, as a system of 
abstract doctrines. It is, in fact, nothing more 
than the consideration, which every right-minded 
Christian, of an age to think at all, will bestow 
upon the most important of all the subjects upon 
which his intellect can possibly be employed. It 
is an experimental, rather than an intellectual, 
study of Religion, which is recommended ; a 
study of its Power, and wonderful Adaptation to 
all the circumstances of every man's condition ; 
a study, deep, calm, contemplative ; of the Holy 
Scriptures themselves, not of compends and com- 
mentaries ; pursued in the closet, as well as in 
the lecture-room ; not controversial, and dispu- 
tatious, and speculative ; the theme of debate, 
the occasion of intellectual rivalry; but reserved f , 

f " Leves curse loquuntur" — is an observation founded 
upon a deep knowledge of Human Nature. Read, upon 
this subject, those exquisitely beautiful lines in the 



21 



yet without moroseness ; observant, without cen- 
soriousness ; making chiefest use of privacy, to 
gain knowledge ; of intercourse with loved and 
like-minded friends, to elucidate and strengthen 
it. 

The less, in fact, Divinity is studied here withTempta- 

i * i -ii tions inci " 

a view to examinations and Academical honours, dent to the 

0 . . . 1 Academical 

the better. Such things may have their use with system, 
respect to this subject, as well as to others. But 
they were devised, it must be borne in mind, as 
all regulations intended for a large community of 
persons must be devised, according to a low esti- 
mate of character. Let those, who would be 
perfect, beware how they model themselves ac- 
cording to a standard necessarily, and most wisely, 
regulated by a regard to the wants of the majo- 
rity. Human Nature, being what it is, especially 



Christian Year for the Fourth Sunday in Lent. Nothing 
is more characteristic of true Religion, than the shrink- 
ing disposition, there so happily illustrated ; nor any 
thing so apt to blunt the edge of religious sensibilities 
as the habit of baring them to the world. It is most 
unnatural too ; for what right-minded person likes to 
hear the character of an intimate Friend, or any other 
subject nearest his heart, rudely and profanely dealt 
with by indifferent and unsympathizing people, or ever 
thinks of broaching such cherished subjects before 
them 1 And does Religion deserve a less tender treat- 
ment at our hands ? 



22 



in youth, must be stimulated by inferior, yet 
legitimate, motives, and kept continually upon 
the alert. But Divinity is, of all subjects, that 
which least bears to be mixed up with any but 
the highest considerations. I cannot help being 
suspicious of the influence of such things as 
Theological Prizes and Scholarships. One sees, 
with respect to this particular subject, how neces- 
sary it is to keep a watch against the temptations 
of this place, in the prevalence of the habit, so 
dangerous at once and so infectious, of listening 
to University Sermons, and afterwards discussing 
them, as if they were mere Speeches, or Prize 
essays. The bias of a place of education (of 
Oxford, I verily believe, as little as any, yet still 
of Oxford in its degree like the rest) is, and must 
ever be, towards the undue exaltation of the intel- 
lect. Talents, as they are unthinkingly called, 
(would that they were oftener regarded as such, 
in the Scriptural meaning of the word !) are 
praised, and looked upon as things to make men 
proud. Academical honours are sought, not as 
means of good, (which they are,) but as ends, 
(which they are not,) and too often rested in, as 
such. To be sure, such mistakes are generally 
rectified, in the long run, even in this world ; but 
some learn their error too late to correct it, and 
others die in it. 



23 



Let, then, the end of the study of Divinity Results of 
ever be the amendment of the heart. If this be ofVSty 
made the object of it, much else that is desirable p^iy^n" 
in a subordinate degree will follow in the way of ducted - 
result. It is wonderfully provided, that there 
is no study which, when rightly conducted, has 
so great a tendency to develope the intellect, as 
Divinity ; none, which so much tends to ap- 
proximate, in every important respect, minds 
the most originally dissimilar in point of what 
are called, natural endowments. The powers of 
Intellect depend, in many more ways than we 
sometimes think, upon the Moral frame of our 
minds ; and, over and above the direct blessing 
which all Religious exercises are sure to draw 
down upon every other pursuit, there is a way 
in which they benefit the mind less directly, 
and by what Bishop Butler calls, " natural con- 
sequence." With respect, especially, to Heathen 
philosophy, we acquire, through a deep and ex- 
perimental acquaintance with Religion, what may 
be called a new sense to what was formerly 
obscure, and new powers of combining what 
before seemed to be unconnected. It is com- 
monly remarked by the Public Examiners of 
the University, that none of the Candidates 
for Academical Honours master the difficulties 
of ancient philosophy so successfully, as those 



24 



who have thought deeply of Religious sub- 
jects s. 

Connexion ft h as been said h , that an intimate connexion 

between 

Ethical and subsists between the studies of Oxford, and the 

Religious 
system of 

s The only good method of arriving at correct, as 
well as comprehensive, views of ancient philosophy, is 
by accurate study of the works in which these views 
are unfolded. The present generation has at once a 
help, and a temptation, which our forefathers wanted, 
in the prevalence of Abstracts and Encyclopaedias, and 
such like royal roads to knowledge. A help they 
doubtless are ; but a temptation to indolence, or 
superficial reading, as well. The habit of close and 
accurate reading is so valuable in every way, that, if 
there were any use in comparing evils, it would not be 
difficult to prove contracted views far preferable to an 
impatience of research. There is, surely, however, a 
method of study, which keeps clear of both errors ; 
combining the advantages of accuracy and attention to 
details, with those of original thought. The books 
themselves should give the materials of reflection ; but 
they should be reflected upon at least as much as they 
are read. Under these restrictions, Encyclopedias, and 
whatever else concentrates details, and withdraws the 
mind from hooks to subjects, have their use. But they 
should come last, not first ; and the Student should have 
recourse to them rather for the purpose of testing his 
own conclusions, than of ascertaining those of others. 

h Subscription no Bondage : published among the 
Oxford Pamphlets on Subscription to the XXXIX 
Articles, 1835. 



25 



Church system to which her members, as the 
very condition of their entrance at the Univer- 
sity, are bound to submit. And this connexion 
has been exemplified by the author of the remark, 
more especially in the case of Moral Philosophy. 
It is somewhat of a confirmation of this view, 
that the devisers of new schemes of educa- 
tion generally declare war against Articles and 
Aristotle together. It is impossible, indeed, to 
help suspecting, that many of these persons con- 
found the Moral Philosophy of Aristotle, which 
is the part of his writings best known at Oxford, 
with his Logical System, which is only studied 
here as a means to other ends ; or with his 
Physics, a subject plainly depending altogether 
for its perfection upon progressive discovery; 
and that, having heard of the Scholastic philo- 
sophy in connexion with the Dark Ages, they, 
naturally enough, suppose, that Bigotry, as it is 
called, and the Aristotelian Philosophy, are, in 
some way or another, connected ; and that 
Oxford adheres to Aristotle, in the same spirit, 
and with somewhat of the same design, with 
which she continues " to bind the talent and 
merit of this enlightened age with the fetters of 
the seventeenth century 1 ." 

■ Lord John Russell's Letter to Lord Burlington, 
upon communicating to his Lordship His Majesty's 



26 



And yet, though there is, surely, no connexion 
of this kind between the Articles of the Church 

intention of appointing him to the Chancellorship of 
the London University. Without applying to separate 
parts of this Letter the criticism to which it is open, let 
me only ask, with respect to the general tone of it, 
whether any thing can be more undignified, (to take no 
higher ground,) than to make the Official communica- 
tion of a complimentary appointment to an Individual, 
the occasion of insinuating a political invective ? 

But in using this word " undignified," I am fearful 
of seeming to acquiesce in a low view ; and I desire 
to protest against being understood to imply, that 
principles which I deem essentially wrong, can be 
rendered more tolerable by being disguised in specious 
language. One fears to stipulate for mere tact in 
times unhappily characterized by an excess of it. 
Maladroit zeal is, on many accounts, a less evil than 
discreet neutrality. One is glad in these days to dis- 
cern proofs of strong feeling and sincernTy on any side. 
For the temper of this age is to decry all downright 
measures as injudicious ; all uncalculating feelings as 
enthusiastic. People are expected to cut down their 
principles to the level of Public Opinion ; and it is 
thought a mark of honesty to bare to the world the 
fault of friends, or of the Church. O for a little less 
caution, and a little more enthusiasm ; for somewhat of 
the chivalrous spirit of Burke, with more strictness, 
and a better understanding of the true character of the 
Church ! the temper, not so much of Crusaders, as of 
Martyrs ! 

The best return which Oxford can make to those 
who malign and misrepresent her System, is to 



27 



of England, and the Philosophy of Aristotle ; no 
bond of union, in respect of bigotry and super- 
stition, between Articles framed against Popery, 
and an enlightened (although Heathen) system of 
Ethics; there may yet exist between the peculiar 
character of the Church of England, on the one 
hand, and the course of Ethical studies pursued 

pray for them, and to hope that they may come to 
learn by a blessed (though it be also a bitter) ex- 
perience, the wisdom of her course. Meanwhile, they 
must go their way, and she will keep to hers. The 
Church is her pole-star. 

Iste agitet csecos error ! vestigia nostra 
Tu, Divina, regas, certoque in tramite sistas. 

Union with her enemies, or even any degree of ap- 
proximation, is at present out of the question. Light 
and darkness are not more opposite than her system of 
education and theirs. But Oxford, as a body, honours 
God, and believes in the Atonement, and uses Prayer. 
The followers of the new way do these things only 
here and there ; or (at best) but as individuals. Who 
shall assign limits to the efficacy of united Prayer 
ascending daily from a body like ours ; and, together 
with all sound doctrine, and a perpetual recognition of 
the Most High, incorporated into our whole System? 
It may avail, like the prayers of Cornelius, even to 
" help a world undone." For, though the task of 
reclaiming the nominally Christian world be more 
arduous than that of awakening the Heathen, yet, on 
the other hand, we have " better promises" than the 
pious, but as yet unconverted, Centurion. 



28 



at Oxford, on the other, a coincidence sufficient 
to warrant an opposition to both together on the 
part of those, who do not wish well to our 
Church ; although the true ground of such op- 
position may be ill understood by those who 
make it. Many will smile at the notion of 
attempting to establish a connexion between a 
certain course of Heathen philosophy and the 
particular rjOos in matters affecting the Church 
and the constitution of Society, which the Uni- 
versity of Oxford is known to favour. And yet, 
it is matter of experience, that a common temper, 
and a like tendency, may pervade views of sub- 
jects in themselves the most dissimilar; and, 
which is yet more paradoxical, views of the same 
subject, maintained by persons so differently, 
and, in many respects, oppositely, situated as 
Heathen and Christian philosophers. How else 
can we explain the unquestionable fact, that every 
page of the writings of such men as Bishop 
Butler and Hooker 1 ' admits of being illustrated by 

k Mr. Keble, in his new edition of the 'works of 
Hooker, has set the original passages of Aristotle in 
juxta- position to those of Hooker, in which similar 
sentiments are expressed. The parallelisms between 
the Moral Philosophy of Bishop Butler and that of 
Aristotle might, of course, be easily pointed out. The 
coincidence between their views of the doctrine of 



29 



reference to the Moral and Political Philosophy 
of the ancients. Hooker, indeed, was evidently 
a profound Aristotelian ; but our greatest of 
Ethical Divines, without distinctly recognizing 
the authority of Aristotle, exhibits much of un- 
premeditated sympathy with his temper, and 
undesigned coincidence with his views. On 
the other hand, between philosophers writing 
upon the same subjects in Christian times, there 
is often the most marked and irreconcileable 
difference of System; whence it plainly appears, 
that there are bonds of union between philoso- 
phers, other, and more intimate, than the acci- 
dent of writing under a common Revelation, or 
even a common Protestantism. 

Habits, of the nature of Temptation, and of man's conse- 
quent responsibility for it; and, above all, between their 
respective modes of treating the great question of Fatal- 
ism, are among the most familiar. The earlier part of 
the Ecclesiastical Polity of Hooker is to the Political 
views of Aristotle, what the Analogy and Sermons of 
Bishop Butler are to his Ethical; a Christian Commen- 
tary, shewing how these subjects may be vindicated from 
profane uses, Mr. Keble's Edition of the Ecclesiastical 
Polity, lately published, is of great value in this 
respect, and will, I trust, be the means of leading 
students to read the works of Hooker, as well as those 
of Bishop Butler, in connexion with the Aristotelian 
Philosophy. 



30 



Advantages There is, as it seems to me, though I am 

of the study ' ' ° 

of Heathen aware that, to some, the statement mav seem 

Ethics. 

paradoxical, a peculiar advantage in making the 
works of Heathen philosophers, the basis of our 
Ethical studies. Whatever in such works is 
found to coincide with Divine Revelation, is of 
the nature of an independent testimony to its 
truth. Whatever, again, in the speculations of 
the wisest Heathens, is found to be defective or 
erroneous, will be regarded, by the religious mind, 
as a proof of man's need of a Revelation, and 
thus be gratefully admitted as an evidence of 
its value. Moral philosophers, since Revelation, 
must write, either respectively, or irrespectively, 
of it. If the latter, they can hardly fail, however 
unintentionally, to do disservice to Religion; and 
if the former, they are of far less use, than Hea- 
thens, as witnesses to its truth. For the value of 
all Heathen testimony to Revelation is (of course) 
enhanced by that same want of light, which, on 
the other hand, accounts for, and excuses, Heathen 
errors. It is not to be supposed, that Oxford could 
ever be induced to substitute, for the Aristotelian 
philosophy, any book, or books, in which Ethics 
should be treated irrespectively of Divine Revela- 
tion ; and, as a matter of fact, she does, under 
existing circumstances, adopt, in the way of a 
Commentary upon Aristotle's writings, the best of 



31 



those works, (the Analogy and Sermons of Bishop 
Butler,) in which Moral Philosophy is viewed in 
a religious light. So that, on the whole, it 
really seems impossible to conceive how the 
Oxford System, in this respect, could be amended. 

Such then, I conceive, is the advantage to be 
derived from the study of Heathen Ethics in 
general. And, with respect to the particular 
character of the Moral Philosophy studied in 
Oxford, I feel satisfied, that, between the Aristo- 
telian views of Ethics and Politics, and the 
peculiar temper which our Church best loves, 
and most encourages, there is a far greater con- 
geniality and coincidence, than between either 
and that philosophy now so rife, which, both in 
Ethics and Politics, tests conduct far more by 
its tendencies and results, than by its conformity 
to certain high, unalterable, Principles ; which, 
for the onward heroism of assured Virtue, the 
uncalculating martyr- spirit of the Gospel and 
the Reformation, would substitute the cold and 
shifting policy of Expediency ; of a motive which 
has no higher origin, and no better warrant, 
than the calculations of a limited and a fallible 
Experience 1 . 

i " The Prudence, which Aristotle teaches, is no cal- 
culation of consequences. It is a practical philosophy of 



32 



Aristotelian Strikingly at variance, again, with many views 
TrTth and of the present day, is that System of philosophy, 
Opinion. w jjj G jj perpetually distinguishes between the 
Good, and the Apparent Good ; between Opinion 
(what seems™ to men) and Truth (what is). 
Plato was, of course, the philosopher who was 
led, in opposing the Sceptical philosophy of his 
time, to protest with most earnestness against 
the system which substitutes, for divine and 
eternal Truth, the fluctuating standard of Human 
Opinion. Bat Aristotle, although characteris- 
tically {in contradistinction to Plato) the philoso- 
pher of experience, never loses sight of the un- 
changeable nature of Truth, Mora] as well as 
Intellectual. He admits, indeed, the general 
opinion of men as an evidence, but never bows 
to it as a law. It is always, with him, a reason 
for inquiry ; it may amount even to a ground of 
presumption ; but it is never more. It is charac- 
teristically the standard of Rhetoric, as contradis- 
tinguished from Ethics ; i. e. of the philosophy of 
shewy, rather than intrinsic, Virtue. If, however, 
such consent can be proved not general only, but 

the heart inseparably connected with the love of that 
conduct which it suggests, &c. Encyclopaedia Brit, 
part xv. Art. " Aristotle's Philosophy." 
m Ao'fa. 



33 



universal", it amounts to a testimony of highest 
value. There is, again, the judgment of the best 
men. This becomes even a standard of Ethics ; 
a kind of personification of abstract Moral Truth. 
For, what these men think (it must be remem- 
bered) is not right, because they think it, but 
rather they think it because it is right 0 . Aris- 
totle has, in this instance, admirably distin- 
guished between General Opinion, Universal 
Consent, Authority, and Truth, as beyond all. 
To us, who at once believe in the corrup- 
tion of the human intellect, and of the human 
heart, and who enjoy the privilege of an Inspired 
guide, mere general Opinion becomes hardly so 

0 Aristotle implies, rather than directly states, that 
he considers Truth to have an objective existence 
externally to the human mind. His dread of the extra- 
vagancies involved in Plato's notion of the Abstract 
Good, disinclines him to dwell upon the subject of Truth, 
excepting as personified by the wisest and best men ; 
but his continual distinctions between Truth and 
Opinion, the Abstractedly and Apparently Good, are 
sufficient to shew, that he considers the Judgment of 
men, even of the best, as no more than the embodying, 
in practical and tangible shape, of that which has an 
original and intrinsic value. The best account, as far 
as I know, of the distinction between Objective and 
Subjective Truth, is to be found in the Tracts for the 
Times by Members of the University of Oxford. 
Vol. iii. No. 73. 1. 

c 



34 



much as a ground of presumption. Yet we attri- 
bute much to the Argument from Universal 
Consent p . On the other hand, Truth and Autho- 
rity are often coincident. Even Aristotle saw, 
that something more than mere Intellect is re- 
quired towards Authority in practical subjects ; 
and the doctrine of Spiritual Influence, not 
merely inspiring (in the strict sense of the term) 
" holy men of old," but promised to the Church, 
and accorded to the prayer of individuals, goes 
towards approximating, almost even to identity, 
Abstract and Embodied Truth. 
Aristotelian Politics, again, in the hands of Aristotle, 
PoiTtics. appear as a far nobler subject than the temper of 
modern times has made of them. They could not, 
according to Aristotle's view of them, be consi- 
dered unworthy the regard of religious men. By 
him Political subjects are treated as a branch of 
Morals. Aristotle never makes concession to man's 
need as the object of government and legislation, 
without entering his protest against such conces- 
sion being regarded as a deviation from the high 
standard of Virtue, which he has fixed in the 
Ethics. Against that view of Politics which re- 
gards Wealth 9 as the highest object of government, 

p See Hooker, Eccl. Pol. vol. i. p. 282. ed. Keble. 
4 to £jv instead of to sv £jv. Ar. Pol. 1. i. Cf. St. Luke 
xii. 15. 



35 



he contends with an earnestness, which, if any 
thing under the sun, any heresy, whether in 
Politics or Religion, were new, might almost be 
regarded as prophetic. Since the Revolution 
of 1688, the essential principles of Politics have 
been so overlaid and obscured by the delusive" 
distinctions of mere Party, that their very exist- 
ence is disputed. A kind of Political Scepticism 
has growm up • and the subject of Politics depre- 
cated, because misunderstood, has fallen into the 
hands of men of the world, who seek to keep it 
to themselves. 

In pleading, however, for the Aristotelian views 
of Politics against those of some modern philo- 
sophers, it is necessary to enter a strong and 
decided protest against parts of his work on 
Government ; more especially those, in which he 
recognizes Slavery as grounded upon a distinction 
of Nature'; and seems to sanction as excusable, 
at least, if not justifiable, certain forcible counter- 
actions to, what we should hold, the order of 
Divine Providence 1 . All that can be said is, that 
such things have been defended, upon principle, 

1 Delusive, I mean, so far as they are designed to 
mark off certain opposed principles. 
s Pol. lib. i. c. 2. 

1 Lib. vii. c. 15. See Encycl. Brit, part xv. Art. 
" Aristotle's Philosophy." 

c 2 



36 



in days of more Light than he enjoyed; while, 
with him, they are much more of the nature of 
contradictions to his theory, than of legitimate 
applications of it. It is only the practical scheme 
of the Gospel which is every where right and 
consistent with itself. 

The following remarks do not profess to amount 
to any thing like a complete developement of 
these views. It is, in fact, essential to their 
very object, that they should stop short of com- 
pleteness; in order that so they may leave oppor- 
tunity, in case any should think them worthy of 
regard, to expand the view of which they offer a 
specimen, and to make use of the clew w T hich it 
is their design to furnish. The subject is one 
which plainly admits of being pursued through- 
out the whole range of Heathen Ethics. But the 
object of the present publication will be attained, 
if it shall become the means of drawing, to what 
the author cannot but consider a very important 
view, the attention of those, who are much better 
fitted than himself, to follow it up. 

The instances, by which the original statement 
has been illustrated, are chiefly drawn from the 
Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle. It has been 
sought to maintain for that work the sort of pro- 
minence to which it is, on every account, enti- 



37 



tied, in the comparison with other writings of the 
same author, or with those of other Grecian phi- 
losophers ; and which it actually receives in the 
judicious practice of the University of Oxford. 
But the principal Dialogues of Plato have here 
received a subordinate notice, as valuable com- 
mentaries upon the Aristotelian writings ; and 
more especially as developing the peculiar Sys- 
tem of their author. Some of them (the " Gor- 
gias" and " Philebus," for example) throw great 
light upon the Ethics and Rhetoric of Aristotle ; 
while the Political work of that philosopher refers 
directly to the opinions of his master as exhibited 
in the " Republic" and the " Laws." The more 
the philosophy of Plato is studied, the less will 
he appear to be that mere enthusiast, and poet 
among philosophers, which many think him. In 
the midst of a diffuseness of style, and a fanciful- 
ness of theory, strikingly at variance with the 
close argument, and practical good sense, of 
Aristotle, there is a depth of thought, a boldness 
of conception, an intensity of feeling, in some 
parts of the Platonic philosophy, which is more 
nearly Divine than any thing else uninspired. 
The works of Plato are, at the same time, pecu- 
liarly valuable, as exhibiting a contest of Prin- 
ciples eminently characteristic of the present 
age. 



38 



Uses of The main object here proposed is to shew, that 
velation Divine Revelation has fallen in with every sound- 

with respect . t/*» i i 

to Heathen est view, solved every real difficulty, and met 
1CS ' every noblest aspiration, of the wisest Heathens ; 
and thus, while It throws lustre upon their specu- 
lations ; approves, as natural, their perplexities ; 
sanctions, as just, the results of their experience; 
It attests, at once, and remedies, the deficiency 
of their systems ; furnishing Aids, and suggesting 
Motives, which are eminently and alone adequate 
to the regulation of conduct. Human Nature, 
its phenomena and tendencies and capabilities ; 
Human Nature, the work, notwithstanding all its 
accidental deformities, all its superinduced irre- 
gularities, of God Himself 5 , was the object present 
to the mind, whether of the Inspired or the unin- 
spired Moralist. It was not, that they saw it 
with eyes of different structure, so that its images, 
erect, in the view of one, were, in that of the 
other, inverted 1 ; but only, that the view of In- 

5 See Davison on Prophecy. (Discourse vii.) 

1 Neither, i. e. did the Heathens consider Human 
Nature other than imperfect ; nor does the Gospel 
treat it as irremedially corrupt. I have lately read a 
work called " Christian Ethics" by Dr. Wardlaw, a Dis- 
senting Minister, written with an excellent design, and 
in a very kind spirit. The author objects to all existing 
Theories of Ethics, on the ground of their overlooking 



39 



spiration was infinite, and its powers of vision 
perfect. 

The Contemplative life of Plato, and the Active Contempia- 
life of Aristotle, hnd their counterpart, and their Active Life, 
perfection, in the Christian System. Both theories 
are right, each in its own way ; and the Gospel, 
accordingly, has recognized and realized both. 
Only, it would unite in the same individual what 
the contracted notions of Heathens went to sepa- 
rate. Plato saw, that merely terrestrial things 
were unworthy of being the exclusive subject of 
human occupation, or the ultimate object of 
human pursuit. He placed, therefore, man's 
chief work in Contemplation ; in the abstracted 

the corruption of Human Nature. This is an import- 
ant question. Aristotle's theory (which Dr. Wardlaw 
does not seem to have attentively studied) is, in itself, 
to my own mind, a strong* argument against the ultra 
views of Human Corruption which Dr. Wardlaw holds : 
while his account of the actual state of man (see Ethics, 
b. vii.) sufficiently proves, that he was not insensible to 
the fact of man's waywardness. St. Paul's picture of 
the Unregenerate man (Rom. viii. 15. et seq.) is the 
true account of that conflict (<ttcl<ti$) of Principles, of 
which Aristotle speaks in the Ninth Book of the 
Ethics. But such description does not (I humbly 
conceive) apply, in all its force, to Regenerated Na- 
ture. 



40 



exercise of the only good part of his Nature ; in 
intercourse with the Divinity, whereof that better 
part is a ray or an offshoot ; in perpetual anti- 
cipation of that reunion with the Alone Good, 
the prospect whereof, while 

Confined and pestered in this pin-fold here 1 , 

is man's only solace, and best motive to purity. 
Aristotle, on the other hand, had too much good 
sense not to see, that man had a business here 
on earth other than Contemplation ; while yet he 
had a misgiving, that his only business was not 
here u . He treated, therefore, the other's Im- 
mortality as a beautiful theory ; forgetting that, if 
real, (which he did not go so far as to deny,) it 
was every thing. The other, meanwhile, the 
thought of man's higher destinies ever in his 
mind, saw not that the way to them must be 
won through homely duties ; knew not that the 
Body, as well as the Soul, is of Divine Creation ; 
and that God, or (as Aristotle said) Nature x , 
does nothing in vain. 

What says the Gospel upon this subject? It 
abounds with provisions for our Compound Na- 

• Milton's Comus. 

u See, especially, the end of the Tenth Book of 
Ethics. %g>j, e<p* ovov IvU^stoh, a^a^avar/^g/v. 

* OuSsv ugyov iretpvxsv, &C. 



41 



ture, (the vvvOzrovi of Aristotle,) but with a 
constant eye to that Future State, which he 
lost sight of, at all events as a motive, and which 
Plato reduced to a mere abstraction. What are 
such precepts as "Pray always;" (be) "not 
slothful in business, but (be) fervent in spirit ;" 
and others, but recognitions of the theories of 
both philosophers ; indications of a system, 
which concentrates the wisdom of all, without 
being beholden to any ; which meets all the 
wants, and answers all the ends, of our Moral 
nature, instead of a part only ; besides (of 
course) the power of alone realizing what It 
contemplates ? 

Look, again, at Its estimate of the Body ; by Heathen es - 
one Heathen Philosopher disdained as an en- the Body, 
cumbrance*; by another unduly exalted 11 ; by a pareTwith 
third, with more truth, regarded as not insig- S? ngeh ~ 
nificant, though any thing but supreme 13 ; as 
contributing to make up the whole of man's 
nature ; though still without respect to Eternity. 
In the doctrine of the Resurrection of the Body, 

y Eth. lib. x. c. 8. 
1 Plato, Phsedon. 

a As in the views of Pleasure, &c. which Plato 
resists. 

b Aristotle, mediating between Plato and Eudoxus, 
in the Tenth Book of the Ethics. 



42 

Christianity has just completed the Heathen 
theory of the Immortality of the Soul, where 
it was defective ; substantiating the visionary • 
defining the indefinite; substituting for the vague 
and negative idea of Immortality, the good Hope 
of rising and living again, with present feelings 
heightened and purified ; with present capacities 
enlarged ; in a definite place, and with a pro- 
vision for the perpetuation of the best earthly 
sympathies. And, as a necessary result of this 
doctrine, It dignifies and ennobles what Sight 
without Faith has a tendency to make us regard 
as vile and base. Who does not see in the 
Doctrine of the (essential) Identity of the Body 
raised with the Body buried, and, above all, in 
the practical result of that Doctrine, (the injunc- 
tion to honour bodies so sanctified and destined 0 ,) 
the verification of all Plato's imaginings, the jus- 
tification of all Aristotle's experience? a pro- 
vision for the " Compound Nature" of the one 
Philosopher, not irrespective of the other's dis- 
satisfaction with the world, and longing after 
Immortality ? 



fnd Aristo- Tiie mora l Systems of Plato and Aristotle 
teiian views ^j^ er m j-j^ j-^g f ormer wholly excludes, while 

nence. 

c 1 Cor. iii. 16, 17. vi. 19, 20, &c. 



43 



the latter partially admits, Experience as a guide 
to Truth. A System grounded on Experience (1 , 
is by Plato contradistinguished from one of fixed 
Principles, to which it bears the relation which 
Flattery bears to Friendship 6 ; that, namely, of a 
counterfeit. It belongs to the fluctuating and 
unstable parts of our nature f . Of this kind, 
according to him, is the (so called) Art of 
Rhetoric, which is, in reality, nothing but 
gilded Sophistry. To persuade a man, is, in 
Plato's estimate of things, to mislead him. 
Whatever is deduced from certain unerring and 
immutable Principles, and admits of being tried 
according to the standard of Truth which the 
Divinity has impressed upon our minds, is right. 
Whatever involves Induction, i. e. makes man 
the author of Truth to himself, rather than the 
Divinity the author of Truth to him, is wrong. 
For thus knowledge is derived to us through 
a corrupt medium, and is consequently uncer- 
tain. Every System, therefore, according to 
Plato, which is grounded upon Experience alone, 
is mere Empiricism. Now by Empiricism we 
should mean, (and so would Aristotle,) a system 

d 'EpTreigia, ti$, as contradistinguished from Te%v»). 
See Gorgias. 
e KoAaxs/a. 

f See especially the Philebus and These tetus. 



44 



based, not upon Experience, (for that Medicine 
is,) but upon insufficient Experience. 

In all this (plainly extravagant) reasoning, we 
witness the spectacle of a great Mind, driven 
into an absurd extreme by its dread of that 
System, which makes the gratification of our 
sensual nature, in some form or other, the 
end of existence ; and assigns too much weight 
to Human Experience as a guide to Truth. 
Plato was, in fact, so jealous of the intrusion 
of Experience into the province of Ethics, that 
he refused to admit it into inquiries of which 
it is manifestly the very basis. 
Comparison While, however, he differs from much of the 

between the 

Platonic, popular philosophy of the present, as well as 

and some . mi 

modern sys- of his own, time, in placing Moral Truth upon 

terns of . . 

philosophy, a sure and unerring foundation ; he yet agrees 
with many theorists of later times in his undue 
exaltation of human Intellect. Conscience with 
him is a purely intellectual Principle. Like some 
modern philosophers, but unlike Aristotle and 
Bishop Butler, he regards the Feelings as hin- 
drances to the perception of Truth. The influence 
of the heart upon the head which Aristotle (as 
well as the Gospel 8 ) admits, he, like many in 
modern times, would discard as a prejudice. 



s St. John vii. 17. 



45 



And yet, the office which he assigns to the 
Intellect of man, is very different from that 
which, according to some modern systems, it 
is expected to perform. The work of the Intel- 
lect, according to Plato, is Contemplation of the 
Good; that marked out for it in later times, is 
Calculation of the consequences of actions. Both 
systems tend to a sort of Apathy ; but the 
apathy of the one is that of hermits ; of the 
other that of cold, speculative, politicians. But 
the fact is, that against all attempts to counter- 
act unduly the influence of the Affections, our 
Divinely-constituted Nature remonstrates and 
rebels ; and not unfrequently softens the advo- 
cates of these Intellectual theories into kindlier 
beings, than their own systems, if realized, would 
make of them. 

The spirit opposed at once to the Sceptical, 
and to the exclusively Intellectual, theory under 
both its forms, is that which, if exercised upon 
an unworthy object, we should call Chivalry ; 
and upon a good object, Devotedness. It is 
the spirit which hazards a great deal for 
what it loves. It rather feels, than knows, and 
rather knows, than can make intelligible, the 
ground of its confidence. The Sceptics of Plato's 
time could never have been Martyrs ; because 
they never felt so sure of any thing in the world 



46 



as to make them think it worth a risk. And had 
even the Platonist been able to realize his purely 
Intellectual theory, he would have wanted that 
impulse of Feeling, which can alone inspire, or 
sustain, active Courage. On the other hand, the 
Courageous man of Aristotle's system, though 
his reason tell him that the result can be nothing 
but his own destruction, confident in the justice 
of his cause, goes forth to meet the danger, 
because his heart is enlisted on the side of 
Virtue b . 

These indications of a system, which assigns 
to Feeling its proper place according to the con- 
stitution of our nature, are the more remarkable 
in the writings of a philosopher, the prominent 
feature of whose views is practical good sense. 
But, as Mr. Burke has so well shewn in his work 
on the French Revolution, the cold, hard, way of 
viewing things which some adopt, though it 
makes great shew of Reason, is really irrational, 
because unnatural. 
Aristotelian No one, surely, who was insensible to the 

views of . . . • 

Friendship, value , in Ethics, of a provision for the uncalcu- 
lating impulses of Affection, would have devoted 
a fifth part of his whole work to the consideration 
of Friendship. The concentration upon a few, of 

" Eth. lib. iii. 6. 



47 

affections seemingly applicable to many, is a prin- 
ciple which is reasonable only, because natural. 
We know how, both in ancient and modern times, 
it has been attempted to shew, that such concen- 
tration of feeling is injurious to a larger Benevo- 
lence. Aristotle, however, saw, and rightly, that 
any thing like an equal diffusion of sympathy is 
impossible, and, if possible, would be undesir- 
able; that Partiality, in the true sense of the word, 
is the essence of Friendship, and what is called 
Candour, its bane ; and that Friendship, thus in 
a certain sense exclusive; little inclined to see, 
and still less so to proclaim, the faults of those 
in whom it has learned to confide, is no hin- 
drance to a general Benevolence, but rather a 
way of promoting it g . 

But Aristotle saw likewise, that Friendships 
like this are necessarily rare. " To be the 
Friend of many upon the principles of True 
Friendship is impossible; for this Friendship, like 
Love, is of the nature of an extreme. And, as 
such, it can hardly exist with reference to more 
than one 1 '." 

e Mr. Newman's Sermon on St. John the Evan- 
gelist's Day. 

h TloAAoij V ehai <f><Aov, xoitu ryv reAeiav <piA/av ova Iv8e- 
p^srar w<T7reg ou§' Iqglv 7roAAcwv a\koc ioixs yap uirsq^oX^' to 
toiovto U irqo; hot 7re<puxs yiv<-<rQai. Eth. lib. viii. c. 6. 



48 



Of a Friendship such as this, Aristotle saw full 
well that Sympathy in Virtue is the only basis. 
And if for ' Virtue/ we substitute ' Religion, 5 we 
may take the Aristotelian, as a perfect account 
of Christian Friendship. 

EthicaUys- it is hardly necessary to observe, that, except- 
totie nearest ing for its omission of the one paramount subject 
geiicai. of a Future State, the Ethical Philosophy of 
Aristotle would be that, which we should 
select as most in harmony with the Moral 
System of the Gospel ; as exhibiting the rough 
draught, and faint outline, which the Gospel has 
filled up ; thus, at once, attesting its correctness 
as the result of observation and experience, and 
its worthlessness in the character which it pro- 
fesses of a Practical System. Given, the first 
Impulse, (Baptismal Regeneration;) the right 
Principle, (" Faith working by Love;") the Rule, 
(Infallible Scripture;) the Moral System of the 
Ethics is perfect. To want these, is to want all ; 
except, what Aristotle abundantly possessed, 
sagacity all but inspired. What a wonderful 
effort of human wisdom is the Ethical System of 
Aristotle! which, regarded as a mere theory, Reve- 
lation has only expressed in other words. How 
far more wonderful, how absolutely inexplicable, 
but upon the hypothesis of Inspiration, that 



49 



Divine Philosophy, which, bearing its inde- 
pendent testimony to the acuteness of the 
Heathen's observation, and the correctness of his 
experience, has perfected his view in the parti- 
cular instances in which it was plainly defective ; 
supplied the key-stone of the arch, which binds 
all together ; and without which all the rest, how- 
ever fair in appearance, and curiously wrought, 
must sink to the ground. 

The agreement between the Gospel and the views of 

. . n , , , man's Mo- 

Anstotelian System is in this; that both repre- rai nature, 
sent man's Moral nature as capable of advanc- 
ing indefinitely towards its perfection. The 
Platonists, like many in modern times, are ad- 
vocates of the unlimited corruption of all which 
belongs to us, as men. Death, according to this 
view, becomes the barrier between two different, 
and, in most respects, opposite, states; the state 
of undiminishing self-denial, and unmitigated 
corruption, and indissoluble restraint, on the one 
hand, and that of perfect holiness, and freedom 
from corruption, on the other. By the Apostles, on 
the contrary, Death seems to have been regarded 
rather in the light of an incident (however moment- 
ous) in a long life; a life begun in Regeneration, 
and stretching into eternity. Aristotle, in like man- 
ner, seems to imply an opinion, that, if time were 
given, Human Nature would be capable of infinite 

D 



50 

advancement. He regarded the present state of 
being, in its adaptation to man's Moral nature, 
consisting of intellect and affections, as full of 
opportunities to be improved with a view to this 
end. What better can we say of the Christian 
Life, than that it consists of a series of acts done 
upon principle ; and in the belief of truths at 
first taken upon trust, but afterwards growing 
into our (renewed) Nature ; the acts which had 
before gone to form the habit, now springing 
from it ; and being performed with less and less 
of reluctance, in proportion as our duty becomes 
our delight? The difference, the all-important 
difference, is, that the Inspired Moralist, illumi- 
nated by Divine Wisdom, let, if I may so say, 
into the secret of the matter, and looking to 
" things not seen," ascribes to the Mighty Opera- 
tion of God, what the human philosopher claims 
for man ; speaks of influences, instead of acts, 
and designates as growth in Grace, what the 
other calls only, (for such, looking merely to one 
side of the question, it is,) the progress of Habit. 
Course of On the other hand, call the downward course 
gradation, of vicious habit, the gradual withdrawing of the 
Holy Spirit; the distempered imagination^", sin's 
deceitfulness ; the voluntarily-induced ignorance', 

h GqlvtcktIcl. ' ayvoia. 



51 



judicial blindness; and how could a Christian 
better describe the progress and effects of sin, than 
by representing it as a slow, but certain, deprava- 
tion of the moral principle ; passing through the 
stage of self-accusing Incontinence into that of 
hardened Vice ; in which the Holy Spirit, too 
long resisted, ceases to speak through the Con- 
science? Or what (again) are the pleas of the 
sinner, but some form of Compulsion k or Igno- 
rance 1 ? the former term applying to all alleged 
grounds of irresponsibility from without, the latter 
to those from within ? And how may the preacher 
more Scripturally and more conclusively argue 
against the popular fallacy by which men, ready 
enough to take credit for their good actions, are 
continually seeking to escape from the respon- 
sibility of sin m , than by tracing the effects of 
outward temptation to some permitted internal 
aptitude", by which its solicitations are too readily 
met ; or by shewing men that the ignorance which 
they are apt to plead in extenuation of sin, is of 
their own choosing ? 

k filet. 

1 ayvoia. 

m Eth. 1. iii. 5. 

B Eth. 1. iii. c. 1. TsXolov 8ij to ulriMui tol Ixtoj, aXXa 

jU,>J OtVTOV, SV&Y) gcCTOV QVTGlVnO TOOV TOiOUTWV, Xflti TWV fJt,SV HQikuiV 

soivrov, tcov &s aio-p^wv tol y)5ea. See Bishop Butler's Ana- 
logy, part i. c. 4; 

d 2 



52 



Virtue in When Aristotle pronounces that Virtue is a 

wl) at sense n*- V • 1 . •• , . 

a mean. Mean Quality, he seems to intend something 
nearer the truth than those who refer it to the 
standard of Moderation. For he calls it a quality 
partaking at once of the nature of a Mean and of 
an Extreme °. An extreme it is, not an excess, 
or a deficiency. It hits, that is, the right point*, 
which is one, while mistake is infinite, and error 
multiform q . In this proper mean Virtue results, 
while the object which it proposes to itself is 
nobler than mere Moderation. The truly fair and 
good r is, according to Aristotle, the motive, or 
end, of Virtue ; but, when successful, and con- 
formable to this standard, it turns out (as we say) 
to be a Mean Quality : to have something, that 
is, on different sides of it, in the same subject- 
matter, which is wrong, while it is right. Aris- 
totle seems, by his qualifications and exceptions, 
desirous of guarding against the mistake of sup- 
posing Virtue to be, in any way, a Mediocrity*. 

° KotTot /xsv ty}V ovvlciv Kou tov Xoyov tqv Ti yv ehcti XeyovTtx, 

[X,S<rOTY\$ SCTiv Yj UgSTY)' X<XTU TO OCgHTTOV H«J TO £U, OlXgOTYIf, 

Eth. 1. ii. c. 6. 

p KvxXov to juio-ov ov kolvtos uXkoi TOO elBoTog. Eth. 
1. ii. c. 9. Aristotle uses co$ hi as explanatory of pea-aos. 

a 'Eo-0Ao» juiv yap dirhcQg, itct.vT&a.'nvig 8s xaxoi. Eth. 1, ii. 
c. 6. 

r To xaAo'v. 

' " Right conduct, according to Aristotle, is not such 



53 



The difference between this view and that 
which makes Moderation the end of action, is 
just the difference between making the quest of 
good, or the avoidance of evil *, the first object of 
life. The one course leads, at best, to the form- 
ation of a negative sort of character ; the other 
to that of a perfect one. 

The case of the Reformed Catholic Church The church 
affords a good illustration of my meaning. Thesenle'^via 
object of our Reformers, as a body, was not so Media * 
much to steer clear of extremes, as to pursue 
Truth. They did not set to work with a salutary 
fear of opposite errors, but pursued their object 
boldly ; veering round (if they saw need) from 
one (so called) extreme to the other ; sedulous of 
Truth, but reckless of Opinion ; to men, seeming 
alternately, or relatively to their own standard, 
Papists, or Ultra Protestants ; and yet, the while, 
instruments, in God's hands, for the production 
of the Reformed Catholic System ; the precise 
exemplification of Aristotle's " Mean Excel- 
lence." For, of course, when the Church is 
called a " Via Media," reference is made not to 

because it is neither excessive nor defective ; but rather, 
it is neither excessive nor defective, because it is right" 
Encycl. Brit. Art. " Aristotle s Philosophy:' 

8 Between acting (as Aristotle says) on xaXov, and 



54 



her doctrines only, but to her spirit, and prac- 
tical system. The Church temper, is a point 
standing in contrast with every thing which is 
wrong in the same subject-matter ; with the (so- 
called) extremes of Popery and Rationalism and 
Puritanism. It is (in the language of Aristotle) 
a Mean between servile Submission, and proud 
Independence ; or between unreasoning Belief, 
and unbelieving Reason ; or, lastly, between 
Apathy and Excitement. And yet it is much 
liker to an Extreme, than any of the so-called 
extreme systems; i. e. it much better represents the 
principle, and realizes the professed object, of each. 
It better (i. e.) secures true Obedience, than 
Popery ; true Independence, than Ultra Protest- 
antism ; the right use of human Reason, than the 
Rationalistic system ; the reality and depth of 
Feeling, than the Enthusiastic. On the other 
hand, many of these apparent extremes really 
approximate, not in doctrine only, but in tem- 
per : e. g. the Popish and the Puritanical ; and, 
again, the Rationalistic and the Enthusiastic B . 

u The agreement between Rationalism and Enthu- 
siasm in their exaltation of the mind of man, the 
former by the deification of Reason, the latter, of the 
Feelings, and the common opposition exhibited in 
this their coincidence of principle to the Catholic 
temper, is intimated in a Tract, entitled, "The Catholic 



55 



Hence it appears, that they are not the real 
extremes, but that within all of them there lie, 

and Rationalistic Spirit compared," to which reference 
has already been made. (Vide supra, p. 33.) 

On the other hand, the Pharisaical character of the 
New Testament seems to exhibit many points of simi- 
larity to the worst forms at once of the Popish and 
Puritanical temper. The same subject is strikingly 
illustrated in the following passage. 

" The Presbyterian system was, in its original prin- 
ciples, as sternly and avowedly intolerant as the Pon- 
tifical chair. It extended no hope of salvation, beyond 
the pale of its own communion. It affected a dominion, 
( paramount to all earthly magistracy. It proclaimed a 
war of extermination against heresy. It was ready 
to compass earth and sea for proselytes. Violence and 
terror were employed to establish its claim to infalli- 
bility. And if Popery had its Council of Trent, Calvin- 
ism has its Synod of Dort. If it abjured the idolatry 
of the mass, it may fairly be said to have found a 
substitute in the ordinance of preaching : for to the 
Presbyterian, the Sermon was almost as much the life 
and soul of public worship, as the sacrifice of the 
Eucharist was to the Romanist. If it renounced alto- 
gether the merit of ritual performances, it seemed to 
indemnify itself, by setting up, instead, the merit of 
neglecting them. If the Pope claimed power to hurl 
monarchs from their thrones, the Presbytery, in like 
manner, held itself commissioned to denounce them as 
traitors to the majesty of the people, and enemies to 
God. If the Pope could proclaim, that to keep faith 
with heretics, was to be false to the Church, the Pres- 



56 

concealed by delusive names, two opposite sets 
of principles, those of the Church of England, 
that is, and those essentially opposed to it. And 
thus, the true Church, although a Via Media, or 
Mean System, in the sense of a Right point, or 
True centre, among erratic and eccentric bodies 
continually wandering over the expanse of In- 
quiry, " seeking rest and finding none," is yet 
not such in the sense of a Mediocrity, or 
Moderation, which has no higher object than to 
steer clear of seeming excesses and deficiencies ; 
paring down principles really opposed, and blend- 
ing together different systems, that it may 
enable them to meet in a new system, thought 
intermediate between vicious extremes, and 
such as to combine the excellence of all, without 
the faults of any ; but which is, in reality, a mass 
of compromise and inconsistency ; colourless, 
though made up of many colours. Only compare 
with the " reserves" and " qualifications" and 
" modifications," to which the framers of this 

bytery could declare, precisely in the same spirit, that 
oaths were nullities, whenever they tended to the 
detriment of the holy cause." Life of Archbishop 
Laud, by the Rev. C. W. Le Bas. 

From all this it appears, that the strong hold against 
error, of whatever kind, is to be found in true Church 
principles. 



57 



system are obliged continually to have recourse, 
the kind of hardihood in paradox (if I may so 
express myself) in which Holy Scripture de- 
lights x . Statements, the most seemingly incom- 
patible, It throws out with a recklessness of 
consequences, an indifference to the chance of 
misrepresentation, which are strikingly charac- 
teristic of the unsuspecting confidence of Truth. 
The framers of Articles of Faith (which are 
essentially remedial) cannot be expected to pre- 
serve this character so entirely, as those who wrote 
out of sight (as I may say) of heresy. But still 
it is a character which eminently pervades the 
Formularies of our Church, when viewed in their 
combination. 

Aristotle's account of Virtue in its details is Courage, 
very beautiful, and proves, I think, that Dr. 
Paley has understated the Heathen side of the 
argument, in his comparison of the " heroic" 
with the " patient" virtues y . It is true, that 
Aristotle gives a great prominence in his system 
to the Virtue of Courage. But Courage, as he 
represents it, is a perfectly Christian quality. 

x This peculiarity in the Scriptural teaching has been 
more than once remarked by Archbishop Whately in 
his published works. 

y Evidences, vol. ii. c. 2. 



58 



It is nothing else than the habit of mind which 
leads us, on proper occasions, to " quit ourselves 
like men 2 ." It is a frame of mind, of which 
Warlike Courage is only a single form, an acci- 
dental result. It is a fearlessness (not an apathy) 
about our duty, whatever it may be. About the 
precise nature of that duty, Christians and 
Heathens would, of course, disagree ; but there 
is no need, therefore, that they should disagree 
about the habit of mind, which leads to such a 
result. What is the true kolXov, is the question 
between them. There is no need to contrast 
Heroism with Patience ; as if the latter were 
essentially a Christian, and the former essentially 
an unchristian, quality. The spirit of the 
Martyr includes both. The Martyr by Courage 
entitles himself to the privilege of suffering, 
and therein to the need of Patience \ Neither 
is it strictly true, that the quality of Christian 
Patience was ill understood by the Heathens. 
The " Meekness" of Aristotle and of the Gospel 
are essentially the same b . 

z 'AvSgslct. 

* So likewise Aristotle's avSgeios is said by him, kut 
ct%lctv xai Tracr^eiv xat n quttziv. Eth. 1. iii. c. 7. 

" It may be questioned, whether the " results" of 
mere Patience have been, as Dr. Paley considers, far 
more conducive to true happiness, than those of (the 



59 



The virtue of the Aristotelian Ethics, which Magnani- 
seems, at first sight, the least reconcileable with mity * 
Christian Perfection, is that of Magnanimity. 
Aristotle's definition of this Virtue 0 sounds very 
unchristian, and his account of some of its 
results is doubtless so. As far, however, as the 
definition is concerned, we shall find that the 
disagreement between Aristotle and the Chris- 
tian, would turn chiefly upon the ground and 
origin of worthiness. The appeal to a sense of 

Aristotelian) Courage. But this, after all, is an inquiry 
to which, with our present knowledge, we are quite 
unequal. The mere doubtfulness of the fact, however, 
is a strong argument against Dr. Paley's rule of 
Expediency. The moment (as it seems to me) we 
bring in our experience to help us in determining the 
nature or ascertaining the causes of human happiness, 
we are involved in inextricable difficulty and uncer- 
tainty. All we know is, that a certain line of duty 
plainly marked out by the Spirit of God, speaking 
through Holy Scripture, the Church, and our own 
Consciences, must lead to happiness, how circuitously 
soever, and in spite of whatsoever apparent hindrances. 
The rest is all conjecture, most perplexing and un- 
practical. To overcome the temptation to test actions 
by their seeming results, is of course the triumph of 
Faith over Sight. According to Aristotle, actions are 
to be done because they are right, without looking to 
results ; tw avtyetM y avtigslcc Ka\6v. &c. (Vid. inf. p. 66.) 

c The Magnanimous person is one who, being worthy 
of great things, thinks himself so. 



60 



(Christian) dignity is not uncommon with the 
Inspired Moralists of the New Testament d . 
There is also (of course) a lower sense of the 
word " dignity," according to which that qua- 
lity is strictly compatible with Christian excel- 
lence, even if not directly connected with it. It 
is not right to consider the grace of Christian 
Humility as opposed to a (certain) sense of 
dignity. Humility does not consist in blinding 
ourselves to our abilities, (spiritual or natural,) 
to our station in society, &c. (for that were folly, 
or affectation,) but in referring them to their pro- 
per Source, and regarding them as given to us 
for certain great purposes. A sense of what 
becomes all of us as Christians, and many of 
us as those who are gifted with certain special 
means of influence, is true Magnanimity ; which 
is not only consistent with true Humility, but 
even involves it. Something of this kind was, 
doubtless, in the mind of Aristotle when he 
specified Maganimity among moral virtues ; but, 
knowing little of the real grounds of Dignity, 
he has given a very imperfect account of the 
quality, which he intended to depict. 

His description, indeed, of this Virtue is a 
very remarkable instance of Heathen right-mind- 
edness struggling against Heathen disadvantages. 

d Eph. iv. 1. 1 Cor. iii. 16. vi. 19. &c. 



61 



Under the Christian system, a certain grateful 
consciousness of Moral superiority, is perfectly 
compatible both with Humility and with Charity. 
It becomes wrong only when (as in the case of 
the Pharisee in the parable) it involves a con- 
temptuous estimate of others. Comparison with 
the state of others, or with his own former state, 
the improved and improving Christian cannot 
but make ; and yet his frame of mind may be, 
at the same time, deeply humble, and tenderly 
compassionate. By the word KaTa(f)p6pr)<ri?, 
Aristotle need not be understood to mean more 
than that dignified and independent disregard of 
common opinion, (of opinion, not of individuals,) 
which is eminently characteristic of the confidence 
of Truth and Rectitude. One who knows him- 
self to be in the right, will (as Aristotle says) unite 
manly straightforwardness with prudent reserve 6 . 
He has no self-distrust ; wherefore he does not 
hang upon the opinion of the multitude, but on 
all needful occasions will speak openly and with- 
out fear. And yet, distrustful of the sympathy 
of inferior minds, he is not prodigal of words, 
and ostentatious of feelings ; ever dreading to 
profane what he cannot hope to make generally 
intelligible. Such, at least, is Christian High- 

7ro\ko6$. Eth. 1. iv. c. 3. 



62 



mindedness ; with the account of which I leave 
others to compare the details of the Aristotelian 
Magnanimity; not doubting that with something 
which is wrong, and more which is questionable, 
in that picture, they will find a striking inter- 
mixture of most unusual truth. 

True and A great deal might be said, if this were the fit 

false H umi- . . 

lity. occasion for it, upon the difference between true 
and false Humility, which by many persons, espe- 
cially in the present day, is but ill understood, 
There are, for instance, a great many views of 
Religion in the world, of a character peculiarly 
fitted to depress Christian exertion f ; and these 
proceed chiefly from mistaken notions of Chris- 
tian Humility, which is thought to consist, not 
in referring our (spiritual) abilities to God, but in 
undervaluing them. The true view of the subject 
is that which is contained in the verse, " I can 
do all things, through Christ strengthening me." 
There are three qualities of its notions whereof 
the world has much need to be disabused. They 
are these; Christian Humility; Christian Charity ; 
Christian Moderation. With reference to all three, 

f 'H roiotvTYi Se Sofa (Moral Pusillanimity) SoxeT xa) 
X £ t%<>v$ Troielv \y.ol<tto\ yoiq e<plevTai tcov kut ccglav oi<pl<TToivTa.i 
S x twv 7rgtx%su)v toov xctkoov, cog ccvixfyoi ovTsg. Eth. 1. iv. C. 3. 



63 



let it be observed, that no faults are so likely to 
gain currency, as those which bear the semblance 
of virtues. For he who defends such, always 
acts under an advantage ; and he who attacks 
them, under suspicion. They are excellent sub- 
jects of declamation ; and at least nine-tenths of 
the world are the slaves of Rhetoric. 

Connected with this subject, is Aristotle's Truth, or 

Singleness 

virtue of " Truth;" by which is to be under- of charac- 

J ter. 

stood that section of the larger quality which 
regulates our disposition and behaviour in 
society. It is the maintenance of our true 
characters, in our intercourse with the world ; a 
Mean between Vaunting, and affected Self-depre- 
ciation. These extreme qualities agree with one 
another, and disagree with the Mean, in aiming 
(both of them) at effect. They differ from each 
other, in that the one is the vulgar, and the other 
the refined, method of attaining the common 
object. Both the extremes are apt to defeat their 
own end; but the extreme, in the way of defect, 
is generally the more successful of the two, as it is 
likewise the more artful. Few virtues are more 
difficult to practise than Aristotle's " Truth." 
Mixed society spins a web around our judgments 
which wonderfully impedes their freedom, and 
tends to conceal our real characters from others. 
It puts us continually in the way of acting a part, 



64 



of which bad habit one of the worst effects is, that 
it tends to deceive not only others, but ourselves^. 

Aristotle saw the necessity of tempering his 
virtue of Truth in our dealings with the world 
by another which he has called Friendliness h ; a 
Mean between Flattery and Moroseness. This 
friendly feeling and truth together form a cha- 
racter which, with the rectification of the motive, 
and the object, would answer to St. Paul's de- 
scription, 11 speaking the truth in love." 

Practical Aristotle, like the best Christian Moralists, 
intellect. cons j ( j ers there is an essential connexion 

between the Intellectual and Moral character ; 
that the practical Intellect and the virtuous 
Affection grow up together, and jointly contri- 
bute to form the character of the Good man. His 
highest virtue of the Moral character is likewise 
of an Intellectual nature. It is the Intellect 
in its right application to practical subjects 1 . 
Aristotle, therefore, takes a correct mean 
between those who unduly exalt the Intellectual 
part of our nature, and those who needlessly and 
irreligiously underrate it. For, what says the 

« See Mr. Newman's Sermon on Hypocrisy. (Vol. I. 
Serm. X.) 



65 



Gospel? " Be ye wise as serpents, and harmless 
as doves k ." And again, " In malice be ye chil- 
dren ; however, in understanding, be men l ." 
And one of the parables of our Lord m is di- 
rectly intended to shew the value of Prudence, 
or practical Wisdom ; the Wisdom which makes 
good choice of means with a view to the pro- 
posed end. And this is precisely the " Practical 
Wisdom" of Aristotle. 

Now there are many, who speak as if the Sim- christian 
plicity which the Gospel enjoins were a kind of and P Pr°u- } 
Imprudence. So far from this being the case, the incompati- 
Gospel goes much nearer towards representing the 
want of Prudence, and Discrimination, and such 
like practically intellectual qualities, in the light of 
a moral defect ; not, of course, a very serious one, 
but something which takes away from the perfec- 
tion of the Christian character. So far as these 
practically intellectual qualities are natural, the 
want of them is, of course, no fault ; but they 
are, to a much greater degree than pure Intel- 
lect, capable of being improved by habit. Oppo- 
site to the view which makes Christian Simplicity 
and Prudence incompatible, is the Jesuitical prin- 
ciple of sacrificing the means to the end. The 

k St. Matt. x. 16. 1 1 Cor. xiv. 20. m St. Luke 
xvi. 1. Cf. St. Matt. xxv. 2. 

E 



66 



Scriptural warrant by which Jesuits, and those 
who adopt Jesuitical maxims of conduct, seek to 
justify themselves, is the text above quoted, " Be 
ye wise as serpents," &c. But they err, of course, 
not merely in taking it as an isolated text ; but 
in looking to the one half of the passage, which 
makes for them, rather than to the other half, 
which makes against them. Accordingly, they 
" do evil that good may come as if good, real 
good, could ever come (excepting only as God is 
said to turn even wickedness to good) out of evil 0 1 

° It is curious to observe how indulgently Dr. Paley 
speaks of the Jesuitical Rule. " From the principles," 
he says, (M. P. c. viii.) " delivered in this and the two 
preceding chapters, a Maxim may be explained which 
is in every man's mouth, and in most men's, without 
meaning ; viz. not to do evil that good may come : i. e. 
let us not violate a general rule for the sake of any 
particular good consequence we may expect. Which is 
for the most part a salutary caution, the advantage 
seldom (!) compensating for the violation of the rule." 
So then, according to this system, Rules are to be 
founded upon a general expediency, which may after- 
wards bend to a particular one. They are neither sure 
in their foundation, nor uniform in their applica- 
tion. 

Are there, then, it will be asked, no such things as 
actions indifferent in themselves, and to be judged 
accordingly by respect to their tendencies ? This, surely, 
need not be denied, while we protest against the un- 



67 



These persons lose sight of the Aristotelian prin- 

warrantable extension of such, which Dr. Paley's system 
admits. But this I do believe ; that actions of this 
purely indifferent character are infinitely fewer than is 
generally supposed. It is a common fallacy to urge, 
as instances of things indifferent, such actions as sitting 
or standing, &e. (which Plato calls in the Gorgias 
tol psTctgv,) for these belong to man, as he is a living, 
rather than as he is a moral, agent. And yet even such 
ordinary actions of a man's life may be of far greater 
importance than he is apt to think. However, St. Paul's 
instance (1 Cor. viii.) is a good one. Now there is 
certainly a Christian way of viewing things according 
to their tendencies, in favour of which we must except, 
while we protest against what is commonly called the 
Utilitarian view. 

According to the Ethical system of Dr. Paley, we 
are to measure Good by Utility, and to ascertain Utility 
by Experience. " The qualities of actions,'' he says, 
(Evidences, vol. ii. c. 2.) " depend entirely upon their 
effects ; which effects must all along have been the 
subject of human experience. When it is once settled, 
no matter upon what ground, that to do good is Virtue, 
the rest is calculation. But, since the calculation can- 
not be instituted concerning each particular action, we 
establish intermediate rules ; by which proceeding the 
business of morality is much facilitated ; for then it is 
concerning our rules alone that we need inquire, whe- 
ther in their tendency they be beneficial ; concerning 
our actions we have only to ask, whether they be agree- 
able to the rules." Compare with this, Aristotle, (Pol. 
vii. 4. among many other places,) «XAa rov trqaycrixov ovx 

E 2 



68 

ciple, (to say nothing of the Evangelical,) according 

uvuyxuiov sivui Tcgog kregovg, xubwxsg o'lovrui rtvsg, ovfie rug 
Siuvolug slvoci [tovug ruvrug irguxTixuc rug too v u,7ro(3uivovrcov 
yugw yivopevug sx rov irgurrew, uKKu 7to\v puKXw rug 
uurorsXslg, xu) rug uvru>v svsxsv Qeoopiug, xu) diuvoYj<reig. 
'H y&g ev7rgu% lot, reXog. 

It must, indeed, be remembered, that Dr. Paley 
differs most materially from some later advocates of 
the system which he adopts, in admitting the Revealed 
Will of God as a Rule. Little, however, is, according to 
him, explicitly revealed on the subject of Human Duty ; 
and with respect to what is not explicitly revealed, we 
are to be guided in our choice, or avoidance, of certain 
things and courses, solely by a calculation of conse- 
quences. 

The recourse which Dr. Paley is obliged to have to 
this system of expediency, follows, 1. upon his limit- 
ation of the practical use of Holy Scripture ; and, 
2. upon his denial of the Moral Sense. For that, 
which, according to the opposite view, renders the 
recourse to the rule of Expediency unnecessary, is the 
persuasion, in the first place, that although Holy 
Scripture does not profess to solve all cases of 
Conscience, and to provide for all possible practical 
emergencies; it yet gives definite Principles of conduct, 
and a sufficient number of Instances of the practical 
application of those principles, both in the way of 
Examples, (above all the Highest,) and of special, though 
not perfectly definite, Rules, to assist those who study 
them in a docile spirit and with Prayer. The cases of 
conduct for which Holy Scripture does not either 
explicitly, or by plain inference, provide, will be found 



69 



to which means to the higher end are in themselves 

wonderfully, I had almost said miraculously, few. And 
then, in the second place, for the instinctive suggestion 
of Duty, when there is little time for reflection, God, 
we believe, has implanted in our minds a sort of 
Monitor or Guide, (call it what you will,) not natural in 
any such way as to be all at once, or even speedily, fit 
for use ; but yet something more than the mere result 
of Education and Habit : a capacity of judging right, 
and acting well, which, even with the scanty measure 
of Light and Help enjoyed by Heathens, was capable of 
being formed into a sufficient " Law unto themselves;" 
and which when expanded and informed by the Holy 
Spirit as Christians know Him, amounts to a Guide, 
whose dictates may be trusted without doubt or 
hesitation. 

The case by which Dr. Paley seeks to overthrow the 
existence of a Moral Sense is, as every one knows, 
worth just nothing at all. He puts an extreme hypo- 
thesis ; and takes credit to himself for overthrowing it ; 
leaving untouched the real question at issue. He 
supposes the advocates of the views against which he 
argues, to say, that a Savage may grow, all at once, 
into a Casuist ; and having easily proved the absurdity 
of such a notion, conceives that he has done enough to 
refute the opinion of those, who contend for the 
existence of a Moral Sense under the ordinary circum- 
stances of Human Nature. It is likely enough, as 
Professor Sedgwick well remarks 81 , that a person, who 
had been shut up in a dark room all his life, would not 
be able to distinguish objects when first introduced into 
a Discourse on the Studies of Cambridge. 



70 



subordinate ends, which, if wrong, can no more 
be the object of a right moral aim p , than the 
choice of them, in their other character of means, 
can be the act of a rightly disciplined Prudence. 
The practical Intellect and the moral Affection, 
according to Aristotle, are so blended in act, 
(however for the convenience of discussion re- 
garded as separate,) that the former is never 
exercised by the responsible agent, without some 
bias, good or bad, from the latter. The perform- 
ance, therefore, of an act which is, in itself, 
plainly wrong, can never by its respect to any 
other object, however excellent, be rendered even 
indifferent, far less right. Aristotle's beautiful 
theory is, that the Practical Intellect, and the 
Virtuous Disposition, grow up from childhood, like 
twin sisters, together ; the natural faculty q of the 

the light ; but who would thence infer, that there is no 
Sense of Seeing ? 

Now I contend that, with all these helps to right 
decision, a man has no need to make Expediency the 
rule of his conduct. I believe that if he be diligent in 
the practical study of Holy Scripture, and constant in 
Prayer and religious Ordinances, God will make His 
way so plain before his face, that there will remain but 
little need to determine the character of actions by 
reference to results, which are, at best, but probable. 



71 



intellectual, and capacity' of the moral, part of 
our nature, with which we are born, strengthen- 
ing and improving with every act of rightly- 
directed Intellect, and wisely-regulated Virtue. 
The effect of every moral act of the responsible 
agent is to give shape to the originally unformed 
materials, and to expand the originally undeve- 
loped germs, of Moral and Intellectual Excellence. 
In their highest advancement, the Intellectual 
element takes the form of practical Wisdom 8 ; 
the moral, that of Virtue, properly so called 1 . 
In their lowest degradation, the one terminates 
in craftiness, the worker of all evil" ; while the 
place of the other is occupied by a depravation of 
principle, confirmed and irremediable*. And every 
act and word and thought of our lives is tending, 
how gradually and imperfectly soever, to one or 
other of these extreme states. Human nature, ac- 
cording to Aristotle, does not exhibit, in its ordinary 
appearance, the extreme on either side. No man, 
as the Satirist says, was ever all at once thoroughly 
vicious ; and equally gradual, on the other side, 
is the formation of Virtue. Instances, indeed, 
there have been, according to Aristotle, of super- 
human virtue, as well as vice ; the virtue of 

r <£ucnx>i StgsTYj. * <I>£ov>j<r<£. 1 Kuglcc ctgsrq. 



72 

demigods y , and the vice of monsters 2 . And 
these unusual forms of good and ill he makes 
the ultimate points of his system ; the extreme 
wings, as it were, of the line ; leaving the front 
occupied by more ordinary shapes of the same 
opposite qualities ; and making most prominent 
those characters, which our experience, as well 
as his, pronounces the most common ; the Con- 
tinent a and Incontinent 5 ; of whom the former 
generally, though not habitually, allows his 
principle to prevail against his temptations ; and 
the latter yields to temptation, though not with- 
out a struggle ; the former being in the way 
towards confirmed virtue, and the latter declining 
towards hardened vice. 

I cannot imagine a more interesting task for 
the Christian student, than that of comparing 
this finely-drawn picture with the Scriptural 
account of our moral and spiritual condition. 
There are (the supporters of the ultra Calvin- 
istic view of our nature) who will consider 
it as opposed, in every essential respect, to the 
Evangelical account of our moral condition. Their 
theory more resembles the Platonic ; favouring 
the notion of a continual war between the 



y 'H V7rtg f^ac Stgerrj. 



* 'JLyXgUTYjf, 



73 



Spiritual principle, and the essentially, unchange- 
ably, corrupt body. 

But to return. Plato, the great advocate of 
the Intellectual principle in its abstracted and 
purely contemplative exercise, had maintained, 
that where this is perfect, moral irregularity is 
impossible. No man (he said) could act wrongly 
against Knowledge. This question Aristotle dis- 
cusses b in a way, which those, who might differ 
about other parts of his system, would agree in 
considering to be thoroughly right. Change the 
terms, and the controversy assumes an entirely 
Christian aspect. It is, says Aristotle, a verbal 
question. What do you mean by Knowledge? 
If mere head-knowledge, the intellectual con- 
viction of certain truths, the experience of 
every day proves, that with such knowledge 
moral irregularity may consist. If, on the 
other hand, be meant the knowledge which 
a right Moral principle involves ; a coin- 
cidence between the movements of the Heart, 
and the decisions of the Intellect ; with such 
knowledge in its perfection, Vice would be 
wholly incompatible. And what, we may ask, 
is knowledge like this, but that Belief of the 
heart no less than of the head, which, based upon 
a rational conviction of the understanding, has 

b Eth. 1. vii. c. 3. 



74 

been not confirmed merely, but informed, and 
made more keen-sighted, by those holy actions, 
which are at once its helps and its results ; 
the nourishment of the tree, and its fruit ? 
He, in whomsoever this principle of Faith is 
deeply set, and thoroughly perfected, " sinneth 
not c ." 

Political The difference of system which exists between 

views of m 

Aristotle the Ethical views of Aristotle and Plato, is, in 
and Plato, manner? j- 0 ^ e traced between their respec- 
tive views of Political questions. Aristotle every 
where provides for man as a compound ; for the 
sympathies of his Moral, as well as the capabi- 
lities of his Intellectual, nature. Plato, on the 
other hand, goes far towards excluding the for- 
mer from his ideal system of excellence ; as so 
many hindrances to the clearness of judgment, 
and the firmness of principle. But each phi- 
losopher recognizes, in a degree, the views of 
the other. Aristotle never speaks of his master 
without consideration and deference d ; nor does he 

c 1 St. John iii. 9. 

d There is something very beautiful in the delicate 
circumlocution with which Aristotle refers to the 
opinions of his Master when obliged to combat them ; 
(Eth. 1. i. c. 6. and again referring to him under the 
character of Socrates.) He calls him, however, by his 
right name when he praises him. 



7o 



deny, that if human nature could be remoulded, 
the Platonic theory would be best suited to its 
perfection. Plato, on the other hand, when- 
soever he stooped from his reveries to the world 
about him, was compelled to modify, at least, 
if not to contradict, his theories. Of this, his 
Treatise on " Laws" is a remarkable proof. He 
had framed his " Republic" upon abstract and 
utterly impracticable principles ; and he finds at 
length, that Government, being a practical mat- 
ter, must be adapted to the actual circumstances 
of mankind. He plainly shews, in the prosecu- 
tion of his new work, that he is continually 
acting " against the grain." Many a sigh (as 
it has been well said e ) does he cast after the 
ideal standard of the Republic. But his wings, 
which availed him when in the air, are an en- 
cumbrance to him upon the ground, and must 
be clipped. He is compelled, however reluc- 
tantly, for the vagueness of Theory to substitute 
the definiteness of Law ; and to restrain by 
Punishments where he would fain engage through 
Benevolence. 

Aristotle, meanwhile, in Politics is still the 

e " II y a dans toutes les parties des Lois un retour 
continuel, et comme un soupir vers la Republique." 
M. Victor Cousin, Argument des Lois de Platon. 
(CEuvres traduites. Vol. vii.) 



76 



same as in Ethics. Never having given coun- 
tenance, otherwise than hypothetically, to the 
visionary system of Plato, he is here enabled 
to pursue his inquiries without the need of 
continual protests against the expected charge 
of inconsistency. He is still, as before, the 
philosopher of experience; but of experience, as 
contradistinguished not from first principles, but 
from impracticable theories. He argues not 
from facts f to principles to the same extent as 
Plato argues from principles to facts f . The basis of 
his inquiries is intermediate ground; the subjects 
of knowledge 5 whether abstractedly certain, or 
verified by ourselves^. Aristotle had too deeply 
imbibed from his master, the love of first prin- 
ciples; was too strongly impressed, through early 
prepossession, against that dangerous philoso- 
phy, which had no higher end in view than the 
" useful" and the " pleasant;" which identified 
Truth with Opinion, the " following of Nature" 
with the indulgence of some predominant passion, 
to lose sight in Politics, any more than in Ethics, 
of the essentially " good" and " honourable" as 
the true standard of right. He admits, indeed, 
what he was too wise to doubt, that the Legis- 

f Ol octto rcov otgx^ v °' ^ Tl *$ fyx^S ^°V 0 '* Eth. 1. i. c. 4. 
s Ta yvooQi^ot. (otTrXwf xou vjfuv-) Eth. lib. i. c. 4. 



77 



lator must sometimes lower his ground ; put up 
with the best practicable, rather than the best 
conceivable, state of things h ; but he takes at the 
same time good care to make us feel, that he 
regards such lowering of standard as a conces- 
sion to circumstances, an alternative of evil ; not 
the realization of the Philosopher's fond wishes ; 
may we not almost say, of his prayers 1 ? 

Aristotle's problem is the Christian's problem Concession 

tt i i i r to circum - 

also. How to concede to the actual state of stances how 

. . , 1 far right. 

human nature, m such sort and degree as to 
preserve the highest standard inviolate ; to hit 
the mean, and adjust the balance, between vision- 
ary notions of perfection on the one side, and a 
tame acquiescence in imperfection on the other ; 
between trying unwisely to precipitate what all 



h Aeyco 8* i£ u7rode<reoo§ t co/ayx otlcc, to 8' UTtKcog to 
xctkw$. alg stmts gov yotp [xydsvos dslo~Qoci tiuv toiovtwv (tuov 
otvayx.. sc.) a» 8* S7r) toL$ Tifj*o\$ xct) t<z$ sv7roglot$ obrKciog s\o~i 
xocWtaTcu 7rpct%sig' to jt/iv ydg sTsgov kolxov Tivb$ a^geris 
eo~Tiv al TOiotuT/xi 8e 7rpu%sis, tovvolvtIov. Ar. Pol. lib. vii. c. 12. 
And again ; 8s* ...... t atvuyxotix km) ^gr\(n^oL nptzTTsiv' 

to. 8s xctXot 8e7 [molKKov. Ol 8e vvv ccgKTTa. doxovvTs$ 

'ffokiTeuso-Q on outs 7rgo; to (Sekriov TsXog tyoiivovToLi 

<rvvTot%otVTe$ to. nsg) to\$ 7ro\iTsla$, ovts 7rgo$ navus to\$ ccgsTtxg 
tov§ vd(jt,ov$ xcxi ty)V 7rcudel<xv, ctKKoL $ogTixcb$ amsx'kiva.v Trgog 
Tag xgYio-l[j,ov$ slvai Soxovo-ctg, xoti 7t\sovsxt ixooTsgug. 
Lib. vii. c. 13. 

1 KaT svyyt. 



78 



should nevertheless aim at, and striving only to 
correct where we ought to elevate ; to determine, 
in fact, the point, at which, on the one side, 
Hope becomes Enthusiasm ; and, on the other, 
needful concession sinks into unworthy com- 
promise ; this is (I suppose) one of the greatest 
of practical difficulties to those w T ho are called 
upon to regulate any community of whatever 
extent. This difficulty is sufficiently attested by 
the way in which War, Oaths, Capital Punish- 
ments, &c. have been, on the one side, assailed, 
and, on the other, defended ; the opponents often 
arguing, as if it were quite plain that we could, in 
our present state of advancement, do without 
such things ; the advocates equally often, as if 
we had nothing better 1 '. 

" The principle to be kept in view, in such 
cases, is that of which much has already been said ; 
never, viz. to do (plain) evil that good may come. 
Some governments abroad, e. g. openly sanction places 
of vicious resort, upon the alleged ground of avoiding 
greater evils. Our own Articles allow of war, &c. in 
cases of necessity. These are evils also, but of a dif- 
ferent kind from the before-mentioned. Taking away 
human life, under certain circumstances, is permitted 
in Holy Scripture. But sins (such as certain foreign 
governments sanction) are under no circumstances al- 
lowed by the same Authority. The execution of a 
criminal, or even the sweeping away of a whole nation 
in war, is not necessarily an evil (in the truest sense 



79 



Aristotle, in his Political, as in his more strictly 
Ethical, Treatise, agrees with the best Christian 
Moralists in paying respect to the constitution 
and instincts of our nature. Using the word 
Nature precisely in Bishop Butler's sense, Aris- 
totle declares, that then only when opportunity 
is given to man of satisfying his social instincts, 
is he properly in his natural state k . Upon the 
subject of Particular Attachments, and the limit- 
ation of Property, he takes against Plato precisely 
the ground 1 which a Christian would take against 
a mere Philanthropist ; arguing, with respect 
to the first, that they are in reality favourable, 
rather than adverse, to a wider Benevolence ; 
and with respect to the second, that it has a 
direct tendency to promote the virtues of Self- 
denial, and Liberality. 

of the word) to either ; because their souls may be pre- 
served. But sin, unless repented of, (and we cannot 
command repentance, as we can command sin,) can 
lead to no other result, than the ruin of the soul. 

The plan, suggested by some politicians of the pre- 
sent day, of making a state provision for the Romish 
Priests in Ireland, with a view to some expected poli- 
tical advantages, is an exemplification of the same 
Principle of government, as that which leads abroad to 
the public protection of Vice. 

k Pol. lib. i. c. 1. 

1 Pol. lib. ii. c. 1. 



80 



solution of Divine Revelation has some counterpart (as 
difficulties we may say) to all these various political sys- 
Revelation. tems. The standard of the " Laws" of Plato, as 
compared with that of the Republic, is the 
standard of the Jewish Dispensation as compared 
with that of the Christian m . It contemplates a 
system of government, in which definite Law is 
the rule, and immediate Punishment the check. 
It is true, that the distinct, though subordinate 
and incidental, recognition of Evangelical Mo- 
tives in the Law of Moses, prevents our regard- 
ing that Dispensation as exclusively (so to speak) 
legal ; while its Divine Origin equally forbids all 
thought of its imperfection, however it may con- 
sist with the admission of its incompleteness. 
Still, however, the characteristics of the Mosaic 
Dispensation, as contradistinguished from the 
Christian, are Visibility, and Positiveness. It is the 
system according to which children are educated, 
and was adapted therefore as well to the natural 
temper, as to the peculiar circumstances, of the 
Jews. 

Again, in Plato's Republic, there are many 
features which render it not unworthy of being 

m For the suggestion of this parallelism, as well as 
for much other valuable information on Moral Philo- 
sophy, the Author is indebted to the present Professor 
of that subject in the University of Oxford. 



81 



regarded in the light of an ardent anticipation of 
the Christian Polity. It indicates a dissatisfaction 
with all existing systems, and a longing after 
something better, which Plato could not realize, 
and which the Gospel has realized. Plato had 
in his mind some well-grounded, but indistinct, 
notion of Unity. This object he failed to realize ; 
not because it was imaginary, but because he 
wanted (necessarily) the materials for realizing it. 
He needed, in order to effect it, a clearness and 
comprehensiveness of view, which no Heathen 
could possess ; an eye which could pierce the 
thick veil of the World, and discern the Invisible; 
connecting the things of time with the things of 
eternity, Saints living with Saints departed. For 
want of this knowledge, Plato was led into all 
those extravagances and inconsistencies, which 
Aristotle has so well exposed in the Politics. The 
one was right in the conception ; the other in his 
objection to the details of the plan. 

For instance, does not the Gospel, while it so Evangel 
far condescends to us as men, as to recognize special 
and sanction the use of particular attachments, 
still merge (to a certain extent) those attachments 
in the common sympathies which bind together 
members of the same Church ? introducing a 
new and common element into our regards, 
which has the wonderful effect of heightening 



82 



their intensity, while it widens their sphere of 
exercise. Subordinate those regards are to be 
kept, and made subservient, to the spiritual tie, 
and the common interest, which includes them, 
while it goes beyond them. The Gospel has 
reconciled what Heathens deemed irreconcilable. 
" It remaineth" (saith St. Paul) " that those 
who have wives, be as though they had none 11 ." 
Again, in the beautiful picture of disinterested 
Love prevailing in the Apostolic Church, who 
does not see the justification of other theories 
of the Republic ? ' ' The multitude of them 
that believed were of one heart and of one soul : 
neither said any of them that ought of the things 
which he possessed was his own ; but they had 
all things common 0 ." The Heathen Philosopher 
had manifestly an idea, which the Gospel has 
perfected, of some bond more intimate, of some 
sympathy more universal, than any special tie 
of benevolence can constitute or create. Yet 
they have undoubtedly erred, who have attempted 
forcibly to remodel the later Church in this 
instance, according to the plan of the earlier ; 
not seeing, with Aristotle, that Love cannot be 
forced • that Poverty is an incalculably less evil 

n 1 Cor. vii. 29. See also St. Matt. xxii. 30. Cf. Plat, 
de Rep. and Arist. Pol. lib. ii. c, 1, 

* Acts iv. 32, 



83 

than the sacrifice of an important Evangelical 
principle ; and that, pending a more perfect state 
of things, one act of unfettered benevolence 
outweighs a thousand of forced contribution. 



THE END. 



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